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L Introduction
There are more than fifty million acres of Indian trust lands in the United States, with the bulk of them located in the western half of the country.' Thousands of miles of easements cross over Indian lands for one purpose or another. These easements include rights-of-way for highways, railroads, electric transmission lines, oil and gas pipelines, and various communication facilities. They are an essential part of the nation's infrastructure. Because of the unique legal status of tribes, the laws that apply to these easements are different in some respects from common property law. There is a complex statutory and regulatory scheme that pertains to obtaining an easement across Indian lands! The legal status of these easements is critical to the tribes and the various entities that hold the easements.
Recently the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals held that easements on Indian lands are the equivalent of fee simple lands? In Big Horn County Electric Cooperative v. Adams (Big Horn), the Court held that the easements obtained for the Cooperative's power lines are equivalent to fee simple lands, and as such are beyond the scope of tribal power to impose an ad valorem tax! The Crow Tribe had enacted a utility tax calling for a 3% ad valorem tax on all utility property located on tribal trust lands. The Act required that the subject utilities treat the tax as an embedded cost and not pass the tax directly on to the ratepayers. Big Horn County Electric Cooperative (the Cooperative) is the principle supplier of electrical service on the Crow Reservation. The Cooperative ignored the act's provision and included the tax as a separate item on its bills. The Tribe brought suit in tribal court to enjoin the billing practice and the Cooperative counterclaimed that the Tribe did not have the authority to impose the property tax. This counterclaim was brought to the district court, which provided summary judgment for the Cooperative and ordered all funds collected under the tax returned. 5 On appeal, the Ninth Circuit upheld the summary judgment, but the district court's order to return all money collected was reversed. 6 Both holdings were based on the Supreme Court's recent extension of the Montana line of cases in Strate v. A-] Contractors. 7 The Strate case involved a jurisdictional question in a tort action resulting from a traffic accident between two nonmembers of the tribe. The accident occurred on a state highway that runs through the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation. In a unanimous decision the Court held that the highway easement granted to the state was the equivalent of non-Indian fee land and that under the Montana line of cases the tribal court could not maintain jurisdiction over the tort claim. 8 The Court proclaimed that its reasoning would also apply to regulatory authority. 9 The Ninth Circuit decision in Big Horn extended the reasoning in Strate to apply to tribal taxation of power line easements held by a private cooperative.'" The holding in Big.Horn is a direct attack on the Tribe's ability to govern, because the Tribe's ability to raise taxes is central t9 tribal sovereignty." This ruling represents a serious threat to tribal sovereignty, and shows the proliferation of the confused state of Indian law. The Tribe decided to restructure the utility tax to fit the exception articulated in the opinion, rather than pursue a challenge to the opinion.'" This comment will examine the Big Horn case by discussing the Montana line of cases and the resulting standard that ties tribal sovereign powers to land ownership. It will then examine a tribe's authority to tax nonmembers and the implications of a recent Supreme Court holding that has extended the reasoning in Montana to include tribal taxation. 3 This is followed by an analysis of basic concepts of property law regarding easements and a breakdown of the statutory and regulatory scheme pertaining to obtaining easements on tribal tribal authority." 5 Chief Justice Marshall reasoned that the relationship between the tribes and the Federal Government was that of ward and guardian.'" The tribes were independent nations that had been conquered by the European nations. As the successor to the conquerors, the United States took fee title to the tribal lands, but the tribes retained the exclusive right to use and occupy portions of these lands.' This formed a trust relationship between the tribes and the Federal Government and diminished tribal sovereignty by placing restrictions on the tribes' ability to alienate their lands and preventing the tribes from making treaties with foreign nations.
The courts and the other branches of the Federal Government have recognized the inherent sovereignty of Indian tribes to govern tribal members and nonmembers within the boundaries of tribal trust lands. The executive branch has fostered a policy of government-to-government relations with the tribes' 8 and in some regulatory capacities the tribes are given the same status as states.' 9 Most courts recognize inherent tribal sovereignty and their analysis of tribal regulation or jurisdiction will depend on whether any act of Congress has divested a tribe of those powers.
It is clear that tribes have sovereign power over tribal members, but problems arise when those powers are imposed on nonmembers. The underlying concern for limiting tribal control over nonmembers is based on equal protection, because the nonmembers have no voice in tribal government. The counter argument to this concern is that a noncitizen in any country is subject to the sovereign powers of that country.
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The Supreme Court has held decisively that tribes do not have criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers, but the extent to which tribal sovereign powers, other than criminal jurisdiction, can be imposed on nonmembers is unclear. These powers are often lumped together, but it is important to remember that they are distinctive and some are more essential than others. Tribal sovereign powers should be broken down into three distinct groups: jurisdiction, regulation, and taxation. Recent Supreme Court decisions have applied a bright line rule that does not distinguish between these different sovereign powers. 
B. The Montana Rule
The challenge of determining the extent of tribal powers over nonmembers is compounded by the checker boarding of tribal trust lands that resulted from the various allotment acts passed for each reservation arising from the General Allotment Act of 1887.2 In these allotment acts trust lands were allotted to individual tribal members and could be alienated after a number of years. Reservations that were subjected to allotment have become a mixture of tribal trust land and land held in fee by nonmembers. This has led courts to apply a property ownership standard for determining tribal jurisdiction and regulatory powers.' If the property in question was owned by a non-tribal member, state law applied; if the property in question was owned by the tribe or a tribal member, tribal law applied. The weakness of this standard is apparent when considering such things as zoning regulations. When neighboring parcels are subject to the regulatory powers of different governments, the purpose of zoning regulations is defeated.' With sovereign powers tied to property ownership there is a burden placed on any entity considering a business transaction with a tribe, because it is unclear which laws will apply. 
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Due to the broken nature of several tribes' property holdings, it would benefit all concerned to have a standard that conforms to the exterior boundaries of Indian lands rather than the current disconnected standard. Allowing tribal sovereign powers to extend to the exterior boundaries of a reservation is supported by the definition of Indian Country found in Title 18 of the U.S. Code: "Indian Country, as used in this chapter, means (a) all lands within the limits of any Indian reservation under the jurisdiction of the United States Government, notwithstanding the issuance of any patent, and, including rights-of-way running through the reservation." ' This would alleviate the regulatory and jurisdictional confusion that the current disconnected property ownership standard has imposed.' Tribes and nonmembers would know which laws apply through out Indian Country.
The Court initiated the property ownership standard in Montana v. United States. ' The main rule established in Montana is that "a tribe's inherent sovereign powers do not extend to the activities of nonmembers of the tribe."" The Court recognized two exceptions to its main rule, which would allow tribal powers to apply to non-Indian fee lands within a reservation.
A tribe may regulate, through taxation, licensing, or other means the activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its members, through commercial dealings, contracts, leases, or other arrangements.
A tribe may also retain inherent power to exercise civil authority over the conduct of non-Indians on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health or welfare of the tribe. (citations omitted) 3 '
The application of the Montana rule has hinged on whether the property concerned in a given case is held in trust for the tribe, or held in fee by a nonmember? The issue in Montana was the Crow Tribe's power to regulate hunting and fishing within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. The Crow Reservation is a typical example of the fractured land ownership resulting from allotment. Trust lands comprise about 70% of the reservation, while 28% of the reservation is held in fee by nonmembers.' The focus of the case was on regulatory control of the Big Horn River, which runs through the middle of the reservation. The State of Montana brought a quiet title action to establish regulatory jurisdiction over the river. The Tribe relied on several canons of treaty construction, which establish that treaties should be interpreted as the Indians would have understood them; treaties must be liberally construed in favor of the tribe; and ambiguities must be resolved in favor of the tribe!' But the Court ignored these basic canons of treaty construction to find that the river did not pass to the Tribe under the treaty that set aside the reservation. The Montana Court reasoned that the United States had held the riverbed in trust and that it passed to the state under the equal footing doctrine.?
The Tribe's authority to regulate hunting and fishing on nonmember fee lands was also at issue in Montana. The Court crafted the Montana rule to bar tribal regulation of hunting and fishing on state-owned lands and fee lands owned by nonmembers. This construction has led other courts to use the property ownership status of land as the threshold question for deciding if the Montana rule applies in a particular case? Problems have arisen when the Montana rule is extended to cover other issues, and subsequent holdings have shown that the exceptions to the Montana rule are subject to multiple interpretations.
C. The Confusion of Applying the Montana Rule
The Montana rule appears rather clear, but the lower courts have been unable to apply it consistently. In addition, the Supreme Court's plurality holding in Brendale v. 5 The Eighth Circuit considered the effect on the Tribe's regulatory authority based on the intent of Congress expressed in each statute. The circuit court concluded that the majority of the lands under the reservoir were taken under the Cheyenne River Act, and there was no congressional intent in the Act to divest the Tribe of its regulatory authority!' The Supreme Court reversed this holding and stressed that the lands were alienated by the Act and that in itself was enough to abrogate the Tribe's power to regulate.' The Court reasoned that the Tribe lost the power to exclude nonmembers and the Tribe's regulatory authority was tied to the power to exclude. ' This case enforced the distinction between tribal trust lands and nonmember fee lands. In cases that question tribal sovereign powers it is essential for nonmembers to establish that the land is not held in trust for the tribe. This will allow for the application of the Montana rule with its narrow exceptions.
This land base requirement led to the strange holding in Strate v. A-I Contractors which was extended in Big Horn. In Strate the Court had to find that the Tribe had alienated the land underlying the highway right-of-way to fit the case into the nonmember fee property model that would allow for the use of the Montana rule. The Strate Court was able to find that, because the highway right-of-way was equivalent to nonmember fee land, the tribal courts lacked jurisdiction. A basic premise running through these cases is that tribes retain their sovereign powers subject to abrogation by Congress. The Court has 45 The lower court cases that have followed Strate employ the same pattern of showing that the land was alienated and the tribes' sovereign powers over the land implicitly taken away. In Montana Department of Transportation v. King" the Ninth Circuit found tribal employment regulations inapplicable to state highway maintenance workers doing a job on the state highway that crossed the reservation. In another recent case, Burlington Northern Railroad Co. v. Red Wolf, the Ninth Circuit found that the Crow Tribal Court did not have jurisdiction over a personal injury suit that was based on an accident between tribal members and a train, because the accident occurred on the railroad right-of-way through the Crow Reservation.w Interestingly this case distinguished the Tribe's power to tax from its regulatory and jurisdictional powers. The Tribe relied on Blackfeet Tribe to argue that because it had the power to tax the railroad easement, it should also have civil jurisdiction over the easement. The Court rejected this argument, stating "because a tribe's taxation power is broader than its civil adjudicatory jurisdiction over nonmembers, the Tribe's authority to tax the right-of-way is not dispositive..' It is also important to note that this Ninth Circuit panel included retired Supreme Court Justice White, who authored the portion of the plurality opinion in Brendale that was against all tribal zoning regulation.
The holdings in Montana, Brendale, and Bourland abrogated tribal regulatory authority over nonmembers. The holding in Strate abrogated the Tribes' civil jurisdiction and extended the definition of fee lands to include easements. Following Strate the only tribal sovereign power that remained relatively intact was a tribe's ability to tax nonmembers within the boundaries of the reservation. The tragedy of the Big Horn decision is that it abrogates 
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The purpose of the regulation was to give tribal members preferential treatment for jobs contracted on the Reservation. The Court recognized the importance of these regulations, but determined that the Tribe did not meet either exception under Montana.
59. 196 F.3d 1059 (9th Cir. 1999). 60. Id 61. Id. at 1064. 62. The power to tax nonmembers within the boundaries of tribal trust land was severely this last vestige of tribal sovereignty and it does so by relying on bad property law.
II. Tribal Taxation of Nonmembers

A. Foundations of the Taxing Power
The power to tax is at the core of all sovereign power, because without the revenue raised through taxation the sovereign is unable to carry out any of its other functions. The courts have recognized this fact and have consistently upheld a tribe's power to tax nonmembers. In an early Supreme Court case, Morris v. Hitchcock, the nonmembers argued that the Chickasaw Tribe's tax on livestock grazed by nonmembers on the reservation was unconstitutional."
The Court held that the Tribe's right to control the presence of intruders in its territory was recognized in the treaty and sanctioned by Congress. The Secretary of Interior had approved the tax and the Court held that the Secretary had the authority to enforce it."
An early Eighth Circuit opinion, Buster v. Wright, was the first to address the issue of tribal taxation of nonmembers on fee lands.' This case involved a business permit tax imposed by the Creek Tribe on all nonmember businesses within their reservation. The plaintiffs were owners in fee of lots in recently designated town sites within the reservation. The Court held that the purchase of these lots by nonmembers did not remove them from the jurisdiction of the tribal laws. This case made a strong statement for setting the limits of tribal sovereignty based on the outer boundaries of a reservation."
In more recent cases the Supreme Court has upheld the tribal taxation power. Just prior to establishing the Montana rule, the Court upheld a tribe's power to tax nonmembers in 66. "But the jurisdiction to govern the inhabitants of a country is not conditioned or limited by title to the land which they occupy in it, or by the existence of municipalities therein endowed with the power to collect taxes for city purposes .... " Id at 951. "They [the Tribe] still exist as a nation, and they still continue to occupy that country, notwithstanding the fact that those who are noncitizens of their tribe hold the title to and occupy isolated lots and tracts of land therein." d at 952. 67. 447 U.S. 134 (1980). The tax at issue was a cigarette tax imposed on nonmembers making purchases on the reservation.
68. id at 152. The Court went on to state that no federal statute had divested the Tribe's power to tax nonmembers in cases where the Tribe has a significant interest in the subject matter, and "tribal powers are not implicitly divested by virtue of the tribes' dependent status." Id. at 153.
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Six days after the Court issued its opinion in Montana, the Court heard oral arguments for Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe.' This case was a challenge to a severance tax imposed on the production from oil and gas wells located on the reservation. The Jicarilla Apache Tribe had executed oil and gas leases with the plaintiffs that encompassed a substantial portion of the reservation. These leases produced rents and royalties for the Tribe for a number of years, and then as an additional charge the Tribe imposed the severance tax. The plaintiffs claimed that the tax was unjust, because it was not part of the lease contracts. The Court distinguished between the Tribe's role as commercial partner that granted the leases, and the Tribe as a sovereign government capable of imposing the tax.' The Tribe did not waive its power to tax by contracting with the plaintiffs. The plaintiffs also argued that tribal authority to tax nonmembers came from the Tribe's power to exclude, and because the leases removed this power to exclude, the Tribe no longer had the power to impose the tax. The Court relied on Buster and stated, "the Tribe's authority to tax derives not from its power to exclude, but from its power to govern and to raise revenues to pay for the costs of government."'
The Court upheld the Tribe's power to impose a tax on nonmembers when the Tribe has a substantial interest in the nonmembers activity or if the nonmembers are availing themselves of tribal services. Recognizing that the power of tribes to tax is well established, the Court stated: "the views of the three federal branches of government, as well as general principles of taxation, confirm that Indian tribes enjoy authority to finance their governmental services through taxation of non-Indians who benefit from those services."' There are some constraints on a tribe's ability to tax nonmembers. The power can be taken away by the federal government and the tax must be approved by the Secretary of Interior before it can take effect. These constraints insure that the tribes will not impose unfair taxes and that the tax is in line with national policy."
It is interesting to note that the Court did not cite Montana anywhere in its Merrion opinion. This would imply one of two things. Montana did not apply because the leases did not alienate tribal lands, or Montana does not apply to taxation. In Merrion the Court did set a standard for deciding if a nonmember is subject to tribal taxation. As stated above, if a tribe has a substantial interest in the nonmembers activity or the nonmembers benefit from tribal services, tribal taxation is valid. This was the test used by the Ninth Circuit in Blackfeet Tribe, upholding the utility tax on the railroad right-of-way. In that case the Tribe's substantial interest was that the railroad crossed tribal lands and the benefits received by the railroad were police and fire protection, and the intangible benefits of civilized society. ' If the Ninth Circuit had applied the Merrion standard in Big Horn, the Court would have sustained the Tribe's power to tax the Cooperative. The Tribe has a substantial interest in its supply of electricity. The benefits received by the Cooperative are the same as in Blackfeet Tribe and most of the Cooperative's customers are tribal members. The Court did not address these benefits and it discounted Merrion and Confederated Tribes as only applying to tribal trust lands.
7 Instead, the Court followed Strate, and applied the Montana rule to the Cooperative's easements.
B. The Tenth Circuit's Attempt to Balance Merrion and Montana
A complete contrast to Big Horn was the Tenth Circuit's holding in Atkinson Trading Co. v. Shirley, 6 decided two months before the issuance of the Big Horn decision. The Atkinson dispute involved a hotel occupancy tax imposed by the Navajo Tribe on all hotels within the reservation. An 8% tax was imposed on hotel guests. Atkinson Trading Company challenged the tax, claiming that as a nonmember with its property held in fee, it was beyond the Tribe's taxing authority. In a split decision the circuit court held that Atkinson's guests were subject to the taxing power of the Tribe, because the Tribe provided police, fire, and emergency services for the property, and the "establishment of civilized society.""
The opinion recognized that Montana and Strate are in conflict with Merrion, and the circuit court attempted to reconcile these cases by employing a case-by-case balancing test.' This balancing test weighs "the impact of the nonmember's conduct against the severity of the tribal regulations." This case-by-case approach seems clearly to have been the result the Montana Court intended when it held on the one hand that the "inherent sovereign powers of an Indian tribe do not extend to the activities of nonmembers," but on the other hand that "Indian tribes retain inherent sovereign power to exercise some forms of civil jurisdiction over non-Indians on their reservation, even on non-Indian fee land." Id. at 1257 (emphasis added) (citations omitted).
79. let at 1256-57.
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COMMENT Tenth Circuit applied the Montana rule, but it relied on Brendale and Buster to decide that the fee status of the land was a factor, "but not the determining factor" in the balancing test." The tax was imposed on the hotel guests, so the court analyzed the guest's relationship to the Tribe. Using the Montana framework, the court found that the first exception to the rule applied, because the hotel guests had formed an implied consensual relationship with the Tribe by deciding to spend the night on the reservation and availing themselves of tribal services!' The Supreme Court reversed this holding in a unanimous decision that does not allow for a balancing test and construes the Montana exceptions narrowly.' The Supreme Court focused on the fact that Merrion involved nonmember use of tribal lands and therefore it did not "exempt taxation from Montana's general rule that Indian tribes lack civil authority over nonmembers on nonIndian fee land." ' The Court admitted "[tihere are undoubtedly parts of the Merrion opinion that suggest a broader scope for tribal taxing authority," but the Court restricted its reading of Merrion to hold that "[alan Indian tribe's sovereign power to tax -whatever its derivation -reaches no further than tribal lands."" Based on this interpretation of Merrion the Court applied Montana to the facts in Atkinson and thus required the Tribe to fit the hotel occupancy tax into one of the Montana exceptions." The Court interpreted the exceptions narrowly and did not accept the Tenth Circuit's finding that a consensual relationship existed based on the hotel guest's decision to stay within the exterior boundaries of the reservation. The Court held that the consensual relationship, of Montana's first exception, required more than "a nonmembers actual or potential receipt of tribal police, fire, or medical services." ' With this narrow interpretation of the Montana exceptions, the hotel occupancy tax imposed on nonmember fee lands was held to be beyond tribal authority.
The holdings in Big Horn and Atkinson followed the trend of the courts towards constricting tribal sovereignty. The Crow Tribe passed up the opportunity to take the Big Horn decision to the Supreme Court. This leaves bad precedent in the Ninth Circuit that affects all tribes, because it extends Strate to cover all kinds of easements and limits tribes' power of taxation. The 
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C. The Montana Exceptions
The Montana exceptions appear to be clear and easy to apply, but most courts have struggled with the exceptions and there has been a tendency to look for ways to narrow the exceptions.' The first exception, as discussed above, applies to consensual relationships. The Montana Court provided examples of these relationships such as "commercial dealings, contracts, leases, or other arrangements. ' This would seem to call for a broad interpretation, which encompasses most transactions between a tribe and a nonmember. However, most courts have required that the consensual relationship be ongoing and that there be a direct nexus between the consensual relationship and the issue before the court. In Red Wolf the first exception was discarded by reasoning that the right-of-way was granted by tribal consent, but this was a property transfer and not an ongoing consensual relationship.' In Strate the defendant, A-I Contractors, was engaged in subcontract work for the Tribe, but the Court held that the traffic accident at issue in the case did not have a direct nexus to the subcontract. L The second exception could also be broadly construed, but has been limited by concern that the exception could swallow the rule.r The exception recognizes that tribes may retain inherent authority over nonmembers conduct "on fee lands within its reservation when that conduct threatens or has some direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare of the tribe.""
In Strate the Tribe claimed that highway safety has a direct effect on the Tribe's health and welfare. The Court held that this broad of an interpretation of "the exception would severely shrink the rule." ' Instead the Court elaborated on the context of the Montana exceptions and held that the second exception only applies if the inherent power "is necessary to protect tribal selfgovernment or to control internal relations."" This same reasoning was applied in Red Wolf, holding that the fact that the injured plaintiff is a tribal member was not enough to invoke the second exception.w In Big Horn the Tribe argued that its economic security, health, and welfare are affected by its ability to tax and raise revenues to support important tribal services. The Court used the "exception swallowing the rule" argument and reasoned that if this logic were followed "virtually any tribal tax would then fall under the second exception," and this was unacceptable." The Big Horn opinion gave both Montana exceptions short shift, but a good argument can be made that both exceptions apply to the Tribe's utility tax. In Big Horn the Court conceded that there was a consensual relationship between the Cooperative and the Tribe, but the Court hyper-analyzed the language in Montana and determined that the consensual relationship exception did not apply to a property tax. The Court focused on the reference in Montana's first exception to "the activities of nonmembers who enter [into] consensual relationships." From this language the Court held that the Tribe's ad valorem tax was a property tax rather than a tax on an activity and therefore was not covered by the first exception." m The Court's parsing of participles ignored the preceding language in Montana: "A tribe may regulate through taxation, licensing, or other means. . . ."" The Montana exception did not specify the kind of tax a tribe may impose, and a property tax is a basic form of taxation."tm
The Big Horn decision left open the possibility that the Tribe could restructure the tax, so as to tax an activity rather than property, and this would meet the Montana exception."
t If the tribe imposed a tax on the amount of power delivered by the Cooperative, this would appear to be an activity, and it would be on all fours with the tax in Merrion imposed on the amount of oil and gas produced. The Tribe has decided to rely on this possibility and is changing the structure of the utility tax to fit the Ninth Circuit's interpretation 102 cases have found a consensual relationship and still denied the tribe's right to exercise its sovereign power. In addition, the Cooperative has a continuing relationship with the Tribe, because tribal consent is required for all expansion of electric service. Also, the rights-of-way were only granted for a term of fifty years, and tribal consent is required to renew the term."' All of this suggests that the Tribe still retains some control over the rights-of-way and it follows that a property tax is reasonable. The only second exception argument addressed in the Big Horn opinion is that tax revenues are necessary for tribal government functions." Another possible second exception argument is based on the necessity of electricity. As the only electric service provider on the Crow Reservation, the Cooperative has a direct effect on the Tribe's political integrity and economic security, and if the electric service is not reliable there is a direct threat to the Tribe's health and welfare. Some control over the Cooperative is necessary for the Tribe to maintain its self-government and to control internal relations. Both Montana exceptions could have applied in Big Horn, but this analysis was not necessary if common property law was applied to the rights-of-way, and the intent of Congress in providing for the establishment of the rights-of-way is considered.
IV. The Nature of the Easements
A. Common Law Understanding of Easements
The basic contention in Strate, Red Wolf, and Big Horn is that the rights-ofway granted by the Secretary of Interior, with the consent of the Tribes, are the equivalent of nonmember fee land." 4 This is a misinterpretation of basic property law.
The grants for these rights-of-way state explicitly that they are easements for the purpose of a designated use.
" ' According to Thompson on Real Property:
The right in land held by an easement owner differs from the fee interest or even the leasehold interest in that it is a "use" interest, but not a "possessory" interest in the land. Thus the easement holder has neither the permanent possession of even a single molecule of the land itself, nor the exclusive time-bound possession granted by a lease. Instead the easement holder has the right to make or control a particular use of the land that remains owned by another."'
The easements granted in all these cases were only use interests and no possessory interest was passed to the nonmember grantees.
An easement has many characteristics that distinguish it from a fee simple. The easement holder can only use the land, and only the fee owner can occupy or possess the land." 7 The easement is only for a specified purpose, and the easement holder can only use the easement to the extent that is reasonably necessary for the specific purpose. This is contrasted against a fee owner, who can make any use of the land not specifically prohibited."' An easement can be abandoned, while a possessory interest can never be abandoned."' The Department of Interior regulation pertaining to Indian trust land easements states that a right-of-way may be terminated for: "(a) Failure to comply with any term or condition of the grant or the applicable regulation; (b) A nonuse of the right-of-way for a consecutive 2-year period for the purpose for which it was granted; [or] (c) An abandonment of the right-of-way."'"
Another distinguishing characteristic of an easement is that the possessory owner and the easement holder can use the land simultaneously. "The person who holds the land burdened by a servitude is entitled to make all uses of the land that are not prohibited by the servitude and that do not interfere unreasonably with the uses authorized by the easement... [Vol. 26
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol26/iss1/5 members can travel on the public highway easement." In addition fee owners receive some substantive and procedural rights unavailable to an easement holder.' " Some cases raise the issue of whether a grant conveys an easement or a possessory interest in land. The language in the granting clause may clearly state that it is an easement, but in many cases the courts must determine the intent of the parties. As a general rule most courts have held that a grant "of a 'right-of-way' creates only an easement.'' L The Department of Interior regulation explicitly states that "all rights-of-way granted under the regulations in this part 169 shall be in the nature of easements."'" There is no doubt that the rights-of-way granted across tribal lands are easements.'" If there are any ambiguities in the grants a court should remember the canons of construction, and decide the ambiguity in favor of the tribes. 7 As easements, the tribes retain the underlying possessory interest in the rights-of-way, contrary to the assertions of the Supreme Court in Strate.'
B. Statutes and Regulations
Easements are clearly distinguishable from fee lands and Congress has passed several statutes that provide special procedures for creating an easement across tribal trust lands. Starting from the primary premise that the whole purpose of trust lands is to prevent unauthorized alienation, easements across land held in trust for a tribe cannot be obtained through prescription or by necessity." The only way to obtain these easements is by the procedures set out in the statutes and detailed in the regulations. This requires approval from the Secretary of Interior and written consent from the appropriate tribal officials.' Public entities with the power of eminent domain can not condemn easements across tribal trust lands, because the statutes require tribal consent and this "is the very antithesis of the exercise of the power of eminent domain.'' Congress passed several different statutes regarding tribal easements as settlement and technology advanced, and the need arose. Originally there was a separate statute for each type of easement: railroads, highways, pipelines, etc.' Each statute empowered the Secretary of Interior to grant easements subject to such requirements as he deemed necessary, but the provisions of each statute were slightly different. Only some of the statutes referred to allotted trust lands and the different statutory requirements imposed a great burden on the Department of Interior. For certain types of easements the Department had to get an easement deed signed by all owners of an allotted parcel. This could be next to impossible, because the interests in the allotments had been spread out through a couple generations of inheritance.' 33 In 1948 Congress passed an act that clarified and consolidated the various statutes."M The Act directed the Secretary to proscribe regulations and required tribal consent. Providing a uniform statute relieved the administrative burden, and an exception was provided for consent in cases where the owners of allotted land could not be located.
The Secretary promulgated comprehensive regulations stating the requirements for obtaining approval for a right-of-way and setting the terms and conditions attached to each type of right-of-way. ' The regulations specify that the party seeking an easement must acquire written consent from the proper tribal official prior to applying for approval." Some of the terms addressed in the regulations are: consideration for the right-of-way ("shall be not less than but not limited to the fair market value of the rights granted"); 37 tenure of an approved grant (is left to the discretion of the secretary, but the term is set at fifty years for most types of easements); [Vol. 26
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol26/iss1/5 COMMENT easements and the possessory interest remains held in trust by the Federal Government for the tribes. When the Department of Interior is applying these regulations, they must do so in the tribes' best interest, in order to fulfill their fiduciary duty to the tribes. Several courts have upheld these statutes and regulations in the context of challenges to the necessity for tribal consent." The one exception going against the tribes is that a distinction has been carved out for allotted lands. The 1948 Act explicitly stated that it did not repeal any existing laws pertaining to rights-of-way over Indian lands.
3 This was done to avoid any possible confusion and to preserve the existing statutory authority.'" A law that was passed during the allotment era allows for the condemnation of allotted lands "in the same manner as land owned in fee."' 45 Courts have reconciled this by holding that easements across allotted trust lands can be obtained by either a condemnation proceeding or by following the requirements of the 1948 Act'" In Nebraska Public Power District v. 100.95 Acres of Land in County of Thurston the allotment owners avoided this result by deeding their remainder interest to the Tribe and retaining a life estate. The Eighth Circuit held that the Tribe's remainder interest in the land was sufficient to require that only the 1948 Act would apply to the easement."
7 The easements at issue in Big Horn cross a mixture of tribal trust lands and allotted lands, but they were all granted under the procedures of the 1948 Act.'"
C. Strate Application of Statutes and Property Law
In Strate the grant to the state for the public highway conveyed "an easement for a right-of-way for the realignment and improvement of North Dakota State highway No. 8 over, across and upon [specified] lands." The state's "easement is subject to any valid existing right or adverse claim and is without limitation as to tenure, so long as said easement shall be actually used for the purpose . . . specified."' 49 Obviously the right-of-way was an easement, and it was granted in 1970 pursuant to the 1948 Act.'" The Strate Court emphasized that the only right the Tribe reserved in the granting instrument was the right "to construct crossings of the right-of-way at all points reasonably necessary to the undisturbed use and occupan[cy] of the premises affected by the right-of-way..' The Court reasoned that the Tribe had not reserved any other right to exercise control over the easement. The Tribe did not reserve these rights in the grant, because prior to the Strate decision all parties concerned understood that an easement only granted a right of use and the possessory interest retained all other rights that were not inconsistent with the use." By requiring an express reservation of control the Court ignored basic property law and invalidated the Tribe's sovereign powers.
The Court expanded this misinterpretation by attaching the Tribe's sovereignty to the right to exclude, as stated in Bourland. The right to exclude was lost, because the right-of-way is open to the public and "[the Tribe) retained no gatekeeping right."'" This is a nonsensical requirement, because by definition the possessory interest can not retain a gatekeeping right over an easement. As stated previously, tribal sovereign powers are based on more than the power to exclude."M It is interesting to note that the Strate opinion did not evaluate the 1948 Act. 5 The statute and legislative history show that Congress did not intend for the Act to be used as a tool for alienating trust lands or divesting tribal sovereignty."
V. Reasons Why Big Horn Should Have Been Reversed
A. Contrasting Big Horn to Strate
The Big Horn decision relies on the Strate Court's holding that a right-ofway on tribal lands is equivalent to nonmember fee lands for purposes of the Montana rule.' " The Big Horn opinion listed five factors considered in Strate:
(1) the legislation creating the right-of-way; (2) whether the right-of-way was acquired with the consent of the tribe; (3) whether the tribe had reserved the right to exercise dominion and control over the right-of-way; (4) The Court went on to acknowledge that the Cooperative's easements only meet the first three criteria, because the power line rights-of-way are not open to the public and they are not controlled by the state.'" As for the first criterion, neither Big Horn nor Strate examined the legislative intent of the 1948 Act"'° Regarding the second criterion, consent is necessary to obtain any easement, but the Tribe did not consent to give up its taxing authority. The third criterion was discussed in the previous section. There was no reason for the Crow Tribe to think that it would need to specifically reserve its rights to govern in a contract providing for a power line easement.
In Merrion v. Jicarilla Apache Tribe the Court distinguished between a tribe's power to govern and a tribe's power to contract, and held that by agreeing to a contract for rents and royalties the Tribe did not contract away its sovereign power to impose taxes. "A tribe's power to tax is not surrendered, unless the contract explicitly states that it is in terms that allow for no other reasonable interpretation.""' 6 As to the Crow's power to impose a new tax, the Cooperative's easements are not distinguishable from the oil and gas leases that were at issue in Merrion.' " "Indian sovereignty is not conditioned on the assent of a nonmember, to the contrary, the nonmember's presence and conduct on Indian lands are conditioned by the limitations the tribe may choose to impose.
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The Big Horn opinion rationalizes the fact that only three of the Strate elements are present by referring to Red Wolf, which was also missing the forth and fifth elements. The Court held that the decisive factor in both Red Wolf and Big Horn was the Tribe's failure "to reserve its right to exercise 'dominion or control over the right-of-way."" This is directly opposed to the holding in Merrion.
In Strate and Red Wolf the issue was the extent of tribal court jurisdiction, while in Big Horn the issue was tribal taxation. The Big Horn Court discounted this distinction by referring to the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Strate stating "that legislative and adjudicatory jurisdiction are coextensive."'" The Strate Court made this pronouncement in order to discount the distinction between adjudicatory jurisdiction at issue there and the regulatory jurisdiction that was at issue in Montana, Brendale, and Bourland. None of these cases dealt with taxation. The Big Horn Court ignored the distinction noted in Red Wolf, that the taxing power is broader than tribal court jurisdiction.'" Big Horn is also distinguishable from Strate based on the type of easement that is at issue. The land under a public highway easement is not useful to the servient estate, except for possible mineral rights. In contrast the land underneath a power line can be used for grazing and other agricultural pursuits. Under the Department of Interior's regulations the applicant for a right-of-way must expressly agree "that the applicant will not interfere with the use of the lands by or under the authority of the landowners for any purpose not inconsistent with the primary purpose for which the right-of-way is granted." 67 The Cooperative had to expressly agree to the stipulations in the regulations when it obtained its easements.
The regulations distinguish highway rights-of-way from other types of easements covered by the statutes, in that state laws apply to highway rights-ofway." This is based on the original statute that authorized the Secretary of Interior to grant highway rights-of-way.' t The courts have interpreted this to allow for improvements within pre-existing highway rights-of-way without approval by the Secretary, as long as the improvements comply with state law.z There are no provisions in the statutes or the regulations for applying State law to power line rights-of-way. It is also worth noting that the highway grant in Strate contained no term limit, while the Cooperative's grants have a fifty-year term.
The last distinction between Strate and Big Horn is the tribe's interest in the subject matter and in the sovereign power that the Courts are extinguishing. The tribal courts are an important part of tribal self-government, but the Strate Court's limitation on the extent of their jurisdiction is not crucial to the Tribe's survival. On the other hand, tribal self-government depends on the ability to [Vol. 26 https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol26/iss1/5 COMMENT tax and raise revenues for essential functions.' The Big Horn decision strikes at the very heart of tribal sovereignty. The Tribe has a legitimate interest in regulating its sole provider of electricity and the ad valorem tax was an appropriate way to raise revenue.
B. Big Horn Sets a Bad Precedent
The Ninth Circuit's holding in Big Horn overextends the Montana rule and is in direct conflict with the current Indian policy of government-to-government relations. While Congress and the Executive branch of the Federal Government are working to promote tribal self-government and independence, the courts have consistently taken away the attributes of self-government." The usual canons of construction have been ignored and the presumptions that once favored the tribes have been turned against them."
r Big Horn defies the basic definition of inherent tribal sovereignty.
Another reason why the Big Horn decision was .misguided is that, despite the Court's holding in Strate," 74 easements are not substantially the same as fee lands. Congress' intent in passing the 1948 Act was to simplify the process for obtaining easements across tribal trust lands. 75 The statute recognized tribal self-government and established requirements similar to those that would pertain to two neighbors negotiating an easement. The grantee cannot condemn the grantor's land, and instead he must receive consent. Both parties understand that only the right of use will pass with the easement. There is nothing in the statute to suggest that the grantor will lose other substantial rights.
The Tribe should have challenged the Big Horn decision, because, the Supreme Court had consistently treated taxation differently from other tribal sovereignty issues prior to its holding in Atkinson. 76 The Court emphasized the importance of taxation in Merrion and, until the Atkinson decision, upheld tribal taxes every time that it ruled on the issue ." The Montana opinion did refer to taxes, but the Big Horn opinion overanalyzed Montana when it claimed that the Tribe could only tax the activities of nonmembers and not their property interests. "8 The Tenth Circuit's balancing test applied in Atkinson was a fair reconciliation of Montana and Merrion,'" but the Supreme Court chose to simplify Indian sovereignty and apply a bright line test of property ownership." Nonmembers that do not receive a benefit from a tribe should not be taxed, but if there is a benefit bestowed upon the nonmember a balancing test is appropriate.
If the Crow Tribe had pursued a petition for certiorari, the Court could have reversed the Ninth Circuit's holding without overturning Strate. Big Horn fits squarely in Montana's first exception."' The Tribe and the Cooperative have an ongoing consensual relationship and a 3% ad valorem tax is an appropriate form of taxation. In the alternative, the Court could have reversed Big Horn based on the second Montana exception. Electricity is an essential commodity, and the conduct of the Cooperative "has a direct effect on the Tribes political integrity, economic security, and health and welfare."" All these arguments show that Big Horn was a poor decision and this suggests that the Tribe should have challenged the decision. It is understandable that with the current make up of the Supreme Court, the Tribe felt that its chances for success were slim, but Big Horn would have given tribal sovereignty interests a better chance than they faced under Atkinson.
Conclusion
The Atkinson decision was another serious reversal for tribal sovereignty, because the power to tax activity within the reservation is essential to selfgovernment. The Big Horn decision was a flawed interpretation of property law and the Montana exceptions, and it is a threat to the stability of tribal relations with nonmembers. The status of tribal easements is crucial to both tribes and nonmembers. Many of the existing easements on tribal trust lands are nearing the end of their term and holders of these easements will need to negotiate with the tribes for the required consent to renew the grants. The uncertainty about what a tribe is consenting to will drive up the price of that consent. In the energy field there is a drastic need for more transmission capacity. This means more power line easements across tribal lands and the current uncertainty in the law will translate into delays and higher prices.
The tribes are free to negotiate for the best possible deal for their consent. The regulations state that the consideration for consent "shall not be less than but not limited to the fair market value of the rights granted."' 8 3 In several https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/ailr/vol26/iss1/5 COMMENT cases the starting point for these negotiations has been the cost benefit to the applicant for building the project across tribal lands, as opposed to using an alternative route.'" Using this approach the fair market value of tribal lands increases dramatically. With Big Horn as law in the Ninth Circuit, tribal sovereignty will be on the negotiating 
